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New Jersey's ten year experience' in the area of equitable distribution 2 is now providing guidance to its neighbor across the Hudson
River. The 1980 New York Legislature approved a bill making signifi4
3
cant changes in spousal property rights and obligations. The bill
eliminated unconstitutional gender-based references 5 throughout

New York's domestic relations statutes,6 and added new sections on
the disposition of marital property upon divorce. 7 It also added new
provisions in the area of spousal maintenance. 8
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I New Jersey's equitable distribution statute was enacted on September 13, 1971. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
2 Black's Law Dictionary defines "equitable distribution" as follows: "No-fault divorce
statutes in certain states (e.g. New Jersey) grant courts the power to distribute equitably upon
divorce all property legally and beneficially acquired during marriage by husband and wife, or
either of them, whether legal title lies in the joint or individual names." BLAcK's LAW DicrioNAnY 483 (5th ed. 1979). This definition, which cites New Jersey as an example, is in accord with
the basic concept of equitable distribution as adopted in New York. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Cure. Supp.
1980-1981).
3 See Herman, Major Changes in Divorce Law Voted in Albany, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1981,
§ A, at 1, col. 1.
1980 N.Y. Laws, ch. 281, § 9 (amending N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1977))
(codified at N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1980-1981)).
5 This modification was constitutionally mandated by several recent Supreme Court decisions. In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), state laws reqqiring husbands, but not wives, to pay
alimony were held unconstitutional. Later that same year, in Childs v. Childs, 440 U.S. 952
(1979). the Court imposed a rule requiring that awards of attorney's fees be made without
regard to the recipient's sex. For an excellent review of the Orr decision, see Orr v. Orr: The
Decision That Takes Gender Out of Alimony, FAM. ADvocATE, Spring 1979, at 7.
* E.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(l)(a) (word "maintenance" substituted for word
"alimony"). See Herman, supra note 3.
7 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5).
8 Id. § 236(B)(6)(a)(1)-(10).
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The passage of the bill represented a major success for the proponents of equitable distribution. The prior statute granted the court no
general power to distribute property of the parties.9 Its authority was
generally limited to awards of alimony derived from the income of the
husband. The old law also limited authority to settle disputes over
title questions, and there was no authority to invade assets of the
husband, or to convey property to the wife in lieu of periodic payments of alimony.' 0
The new law directs the courts to allow "equitable distribution""
of "marital property" 12 in any matrimonial cases after July 19, 1980.
The current law provides certain guidelines for the court to consider
in the division of property.' 3
Although the bill passed the legislature easily, there are now
approximately one hundred different bills pending which would refine, reform, or repeal the new law. Of special note in this regard is
the opposition to the law by some women's groups intent upon having
the terminology "equitable distribution" changed to "equal distribution."

'4

New York is the most recent addition to the thirty-eight states
which have now enacted statutes providing for the equitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage.' 5 Although general
agreement exists as to basic equitable distribution principles, there are
major differences as to which assets are to be included in the pool of
assets subject to equitable distribution. '6 Since New Jersey has been
9Id. § 236.
10 Foster & Freed, Explanationof the New York 1980 EquitableDistributionLaw, [1980] 6

FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2651-52.
t1N.Y. Doam. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(c). This section provides: "'Marital property shall be
distributed equitably between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the
respective parties." Id.
12 Id. § 236(B)(1)(c). Marital property is defined as "[a]ll property acquired by either or both
spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held, except as
otherwise provided in agreement pursuant to subdivision three of this part." Id.
13 Id. § 236(B)(5)(d). See text accompanying note 37 infra.
14 The concept of equal distribution is based upon the philosophy of community property
jurisdictions. In these states, which include Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisana, Nevada,
Texas, and Washington, all property earned during the marriage is considered to belong to the
community of the marriage. See Greene, Comparison of Property Aspects and Common Law
Marital Property Systems and their Relative Compatability with the Current View of the
MarriageRelationship and the Rights of Women, 13 CEIGHTON L. Rxv. 71 (1979); Foster &
Freed, Divorce Reform: Equitable Distributionof Property, 183 N.Y.L.J. 103 (May 28, 1980);
Sassower, Looking Anew For FairDivorce Law, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1980, § 11, at 18, col. 1;
Sassower, Fairnessin Divorce, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1980, § A, at 31.
IsSee Foster & Freed, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1, 1980, [1980]
6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4043.
Is Id.
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in the forefront of the development of guidelines for equitable distribution for ten years, New York will find a conveniently close basis for
similar interpretations of their newly established law. New York is
expected to rely on New Jersey's experience in defining the scope of
marital property to be included in equitable distribution, separate
property not subject to such distribution, and exceptions to both
categories.
As an aid to the matrimonial practitioner, this article outlines the
various provisions of equitable distribution in the recent New York
enactments, and compares and contrasts features of their New Jersey
counterparts.
I. PURPOSE OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

The fundamental principle of equitable distribution was declared by the New Jersey supreme court in the case of Rothman v.
Rothman,17 where the court stated: "the division of property upon
divorce is responsive to the concept that marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, that is in many ways akin to a partnership." 18
New York has adopted the Rothman view. In doing so, the
statute acknowledges that while marriage is a partnership resulting in
a single economic entity, its dissolution will not always result in an
equal division of assets.'" This view differs from that of jurisdictions
which view the marriage as the creation of an "equal" partnership,
and which require an equal division of assets. 2 The new law permits
the New York courts to direct one spouse to pay maintenance to the
other on a temporary or a permanent basis "in such amount as justice
requires, having regard for the circumstances of the case and of the
'2
respective parties." 1
The courts in New York are directed to consider ten different
factors in determining maintenance, the last of which, "any other
17 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974).
11 Id. at 228-29, 320 A.2d at 501-02. It should be noted that the evaluation of a homemaker's
service is of ongoing interest to courts. See Bruch, Property Rightu of Defacto Spouses Including
Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1976); Hauserman &
Fethke, Valuation of a Homemaker's Services, 22 TRIAL LAW CUIDE 249 (1978); Weitzman,
Legal Regulation of Marriageand Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1169 (1974).
"9 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(c). For the text of the statute see note 12 supra.
20 See note 14 supra. Also note that beyond a mere division of property, courts have had to
confront rapidly changing attitudes concerning the roles of respective spouses in the marriage.
See Foster & Freed, Marital Property and the Chancellors Foot, 10 FAM. L.Q. 55 (1976);
Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum, and
Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1036 (1972).
21 N.Y. DoM. RL.. LAW § 236(B)(6)(a).
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factor which the court shall find to be just and proper," 22 is an

all-encompassing criterion. These ten criteria for determining maintenance awards are analogous to those utilized by New Jersey courts. 3
The 1973 case of Greenberg v. Greenberg24 set forth a list of six

factors2 5 to be considered in determining an award of maintenance.
Other New Jersey courts over the years have added factors to the ones

utilized by the Greenbergcourt.26 Together with the basic principles
of equity,21 these criteria form the basis for both New Jersey law and
the statute adopted in New York.28

2 Id. The ten factors to be considered in an award of maintenance are:
(1) the income and property of the respective parties in including marital property
distributed puisuant to subdivision five of this part,
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the present and future capacity of the person having need to be self-supporting:
(4) the period of time and training necessary to enable the person having need to
become self-supporting;
(5) the presence of children of the marriage in the respective homes of the parties:
(6) the standard of living established during the marriage where practical and
relevant;
(7) the tax consequences to each party;
(8) contributions and services of the party seeking maintenance as a spouse, parent,
wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other
party;
(9) the wasteful dissipation of family assets by either spouse; and
(10) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.
Id.
23 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982) allows the court to make such
orders as to alimony or maintenance "as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the
case shall render fit, reasonable and just."
24 126 N.J. Super. 96, 312 A.2d 878 (App. Div. 1973).
25 Id. at 100, 312 A.2d at 880. The six factors enumerated by the court were: "(1) the actual
needs of the wife; (2) the husband's actual means and his ability to pay support; (3) the physical
condition of the parties; (4) their social position; (5) the separate property and income of the
wife, and (6) any other factors which bear upon the question of fair and reasonable support." Id.
25 See, e.g., Scalingi v. Scalingi, 65 N.J. 180, 320 A.2d 475 (1974); Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J.
63, 275 A.2d 132 (1971); Pascarella v. Pascarella, 165 N.J. Super. 558, 398 A.2d 921 (App. Div.
1979); Lynn v. Lynn, 153 N.J. Super. 377, 379 A.2d 1046 (Ch. Div. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 165 N.J. Super 328, 298 A.2d 141 (App. Div. 1979).
27 In New Jersey, matrimonial actions are adjudicated in the chancery division of the
superior court according to the rules of equity. N.J. CT. R. 4:75.
$ There is an area in which the two states appear to differ. The tax consequences to the
parties, criterion number 7 in the New York formulation, see note 22 supra, is only implicit
among the broader factors to be considered by New Jersey courts when determining the income
of the parties and arriving at a maintenance award. One New Jersey case, however, has
explicitly included this as a factor to be considered. In Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d
484 (1974), the Supreme Court of New Jersey specifically listed tax consequences as a consideration in arriving at any equitable property distribution or award of alimony or maintenance. Id.
at 212-13, 320 A.2d at 492-93.
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II. PROCEDURE

Generally, statutory law and court interpretations require equitable distribution of property to be fair and just, with consideration
given to all circumstances in a specific case. The relevant procedure to
be utilized by trial judges in New York 29 is similar to the standards set
forth for New Jersey in the Rothman case. 30 The Rothman court
stated:
In receiving and considering evidence designed to equip him to
make an equitable distribution of marital assets, a trial judge enters
upon a three-step proceeding. Assuming that some allocation is to
be made, he must first decide what specific property of each spouse
is eligible for distribution. Secondly, he must determine its value
for purposes of such distribution. Thirdly, he must decide how such
allocation can most equitably be made. 3'
Note that division and distribution of property represents only one of
the economic incidents of divorce. Alimony ("maintenance" in New
York) and child support may be of equal importance.3 2 Another
consideration of significance may be the possession and occupancy of
the marital residence for a limited, pre-set period of time, usually
until emancipation of the parties' children. 33 When these items are
considered in conjunction with the normal concept of division of
property, the scope of equitable distribution is expanded, creating the
opportunity for innovative interpretation at the trial level. 34
Since these diverse considerations are to be taken into account
under the new law, there is likely to be a plethora of trial court
interpretations. 35 For the erudite practitioner, the touchstone for
interpretations will be the desire for more property and less alimony
than under the prior New York law. Given the high rate of inflation, a
spouse may be expected to choose a larger share of the assets, at their
current value, rather than opt for alimony which will diminish in
purchasing power as time progresses.

'

N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(3).
See notes 17 & 18 supra and accompanying text.
" 65 N.J. at 232, 320 A.2d at 503.
12 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (B)(6)-(7).

13 Id. § 236(B)(5)(f).

", It should be noted that judges interpreting the New York Domestic Relations Act will have
to account for changing spousal roles and the increasing number of working women who would
prefer a division of the marital assets to traditional maintenance or alimony payments.
"' Thus far, the results have been inconclusive. See notes 142-54 infra and accompanying text
for a discussion of New York court opinions in this area.
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III. GUIDELINES

After July, 1980, and in the absence of an agreement between the
parties, a New York court arriving at an equitable distribution is
directed to consider ten factors set forth by statute. 3 These ten
non-discretionary factors are:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage,
and at the time of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both
parties;
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital
residence and to use or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the
marriage as of the date of dissolution;
(5) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part,
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the
party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and
contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and
homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other
party;
(7) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
(8) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset
or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the
economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and
free from any claim or interference by the other party;
(10) any other factor which the Court shall expressly find to be just
and proper. 37
Marital fault is not implied in the New York statute. 38 In a case
involving grievous misconduct, it is possible that items of that nature
might be considered within the tenth criterion listed above: "any
39
other factor which the court shall expressly find just and proper."
The purpose of the statute, however, is to determine economic justice
40
and not to punish marital fault.

30 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d).
31 Id. For a review of similar criteria employed by New Jersey tribunals, see note 43 infra
and accompanying text. See also Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1978); Woliner v.
Woliner, 132 N.J. Super. 216, 333 A.2d 283 (App. Div.), af'd, 68 N.J. 234, 344 A.2d 781
(1975).
39See Foster, Equitable Distribution: An Explanation of New York's New Statute. 184
N.Y.L.J. 17 (July 24, 1980).
" N.Y. Doam. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(10).
40 See Foster, supra note 38.
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In New Jersey, the guideline criteria to be utilized by a trial
judge have been outlined by case law rather than by statute, as in
New York. 4' A list of such criteria were included in the seminal case
42
of Painterv. Painter:
Guideline criteria over the broad spectrum of litigation in this area
include: (1) respective age, background and earning ability of the
parties; (2) duration of the marriage; (3) the standard of living of
the parties during the marriage; (4) what money or property each
brought into the marriage; (5) the present income of the parties; (6)
the property acquired during the marriage by either or both parties; (7) the source of acquisition; (8) the current value and income
producing capacity of the property; (9) the debts and liabilities of
the parties to the marriage; (10) the present mental and physical
health of the parties; (11) the probability of continuing present
employment at present earnings or better in the future; (12) effect
of distribution of assets on the ability to pay alimony and support,
and (13) gifts from one spouse to the other during marriage.4 3
In addition to the aforementioned guidelines, the Painter court
also reviewed section 307 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act.4 4 The provisions of that section of the Act contain the following
criteria:
(1) contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property, including contribution of a spouse as a homemaker;
(2) value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) duration of the marriage; and
(4) economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of
property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable
periods to the spouse having custody of any children.4 5
Although the Painter court approved these criteria set out by the
lower court, it was quick to add that these factors were to be considered only "illustrative and not exclusive." 46

See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
13Id. at 211, 320 A.2d at 492 (quoting Painter, 118 N.J. Super. at 335, 287 A.2d at 469.
" Id. at 211-12, 320 A.2d at 492.
" UNFORM MAMCE AND DIvoRcE ACr § 307 (Alternative B) (West 1970).
4665 N.J. at 212, 320 A.2d at 492. A slightly different approach to this area is found in
UNIFORM MARRIACE AND DIvoRcE Acr § 307 (Alternative A) (West 1970), which states:
The court shall consider the duration of the marriage, and prior marriage of either
party, antenuptial agreement of the parties, the age, health, station, occupation,
4

42

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:37

In New Jersey, marital fault is also not an appropriate criterion
for consideration in determining equitable distribution of marital
assets.47 Nevertheless, where the circumstances presented are of a
highly unusual nature, New York, 48 like New Jersey, 49 seems to pro-

vide discretion to the trial court to consider marital fault.
IV.

"MARITAL PROPERTY" AND "SEPARATE PROPERTY" DEFINED

In arriving at a decision for equitable distribution, New York
courts must follow the statute, which defines the key terms "marital" 50 and "separate" 5 ' property. The New York law follows the rationale of exempting separate property from consideration in equitable distribution. 52 In New York, separate property will include assets
acquired by gift or inheritance from someone other than a spouse, the
increase in value of separate assets, except if such increase is attributable to the efforts of the other spouse, 53 compensation for personal
injuries, and property described as such by agreement between the
parties. 54 Marital property is defined as all property acquired by
either spouse during the marriage and before execution of a separation
agreement or the beginning of a matrimonial action, but excluding

amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities,
and needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the apportionment is
in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for future
acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or
appreciation in value of the respective estates, and the contribution of a spouse as a
homemaker or to the family unit.
Id. See Note, Property, Maintenance, and Child Support Decrees Under the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act, 18 S.D. L. Rav. 559 (1973).
47 See Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d 478 (1974).
48 See notes 38 & 39 supra and accompanying text.
" See D'Arc v. D'Arc, 164 N.J. Super. 226, 395 A.2d 1270 (Ch. Div. 1970) (husband
contracted for murder of wife).
10 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(c). See note 12 supra.
5 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1). Separate property is defined as:
(1) property acquired before marriage or property acquired by bequest, devise, or
descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse;
(2) compensation for personal injuries;
(3) property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of separate property,
except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or
efforts of the other spouse;
(4) property described as separate property by written agreement of the parties
pursuant to subdivision three of this part.
Id.
52Id. § 236(B)(5)b-c. New Jersey defines separate property in a similar way. See 65 N.J. at
214, 320 A.2d at 493.
'5 See notes 57-63 infra and accompanying text.
'A Foster & Freed, supra note 10, at 2650. See note 50 supra.
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separate property and property which the parties have agreed to treat
in other ways.55
A subtle difference between the New York statute and the New
Jersey case law did exist prior to the new bill in the treatment of
property acquired by gift, devise, or bequest. New Jersey did include
such assets as marital property. A recent New Jersey statute, however,
has changed the definitions of separate and marital property. Property acquired by gift, devise, or bequest, with an exception for interspousal gifts, is now deemed separate property. 56 As a result, the two
jurisdictions now have an aligned view of marital and separate property.

As a practical matter, there is still one remaining distinction
between the definitions of marital and separate property which will
create the most confusion in the forthcoming interpretations of the
New York statute. The New York statute specifically exempts from
equitable distribution the appreciation in value of separate property-except where the appreciation is due in part to the contributions
or efforts of the other spouse.. 7
In contrast, the New Jersey law exempts an increase in value of
separate property unless the increase is attributable to the efforts of
either spouse. 58 The import of the distinction between "other" and
"either" spouse becomes apparent by the use of an example. The
situation will often arise in matrimonial actions where one spouse, A,
brings property into the marriage to B. Under the laws of both jurisdictions, the property belonging to A before the marriage is separate
property, and therefore not subject to equitable distribution. The
difference between the jurisdictions is in the classification of the increase in the value of that property in certain circumstances. If the
increase in value is due to factors other than efforts of A or B, then
under both interpretations the increase would be separate property,
and not subject to equitable distribution. If, however, the increase is
due only to A's efforts, there is a difference in the treatment of that
increase by the two jurisdictions. Since A brought the property into
the marriage, he cannot be considered the "other" party under the
New York statute, and so A's efforts would not serve as a basis for a
finding that the increase in value is marital property subject to equitable distribution. This increase in value in New York would be considered separate property. In New Jersey, however, it would not matter
"

Foster & Freed, supra note 10, at 2650. See note 12 supra.

N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2A:34-23, as amended by 1980 N.J. Laws, ch. 181.

n, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(1)(d)(3).
See Painter,65 N.J. at 217, 320 A.2d at 495.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:37

which spouse's efforts increased the value of the separate property.
Since the New Jersey exemption allows for the inclusion of part of
"either" spouse's effort, the increase would be marital property.
Therefore, B would be entitled to equitable distribution of the increased value of the property in New Jersey, but not in New York.
It becomes apparent that the New York view of the exception of
the increase in value of separate property created by the spouse who
originally acquired the asset is incongruent with established New
Jersey case law, and, most importantly, with other provisions of the
New York statute. For example, the memorandum in support of the
then-proposed statute stated that one of the purposes of the New York
bill was to equitably distribute between the parties taking into consideration the circumstances of the parties. Included among these is a
spouse's contribution as a homemaker. 5 It is this contribution of the
homemaker-spouse who did not bring the separate property into the
marriage that would not normally increase the value of the property,
which the New York statute fails to consider. 0 This area is surely one
marked for further interpretation by the New York judiciary. The
interpretation should follow the New Jersey view, and consider the
efforts of "either" spouse. The judiciary is likely to broadly interpret
the meaning of the term "efforts" as used in the statute. This would
allow an opinion in which the "efforts of the other spouse" 6' is considered to include the contributions of a homemaker, regardless of how
attenuated the relation between the two may be.
Distribution of separate property which is commingled with
marital property, and vested interests, are two areas in which the
drafters of the New York statute did anticipate special problems. The
drafters sought guidance from several sources-again most notably
from the New Jersey case law.
A. Commingling of Marital and Separate Property
The general rule is that by commingling the property, the separate property becomes subject to distribution along with the marital

5 Memorandum in Support of Legislation, N.Y. DoM. RFL. LAW § 236 (Assemblyman
Burrows).
00 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(d)(3) makes no provision for a homemaker-spouse to
share in the increased value of separate property unless the increase was due at least in part to
the efforts of that homemaker. By contrast, a New Jersey homemaker shares in the increase in
value of separate property if either spouse's efforts contributed to that gain. 65 N.J. at 217, 320
A.2d at 495.
01 N.Y. DOM. REL.

LAW

§ 236(B)(1)(d)(3).
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property.62 In New York, as in New Jersey,6 3 the burden of tracing
assets from the original source is placed upon the spouse claiming the
property to be exempt from distribution as marital property.
A closely related question involves the situation where one party
has used marital assets to acquire personal property. In equitable
distribution, the court may choose to place such diminished assets
among the assets purchased with the money derived from the sale of
the marital property. If the acquiring spouse, however, has depleted
all or most of the marital assets to obtain the subsequent acquisition,
this would leave nothing to distribute to the other spouse. In such a
situation, the court may require a judicial sale of the acquired asset to
produce sufficient cash for the second spouse.6 4
B. Vested Rights/Corporate Valuations
In general, only property acquired during the life of the marriage
is to be considered distributable upon divorce. Additionally, only
property possessed at the time of the matrimonial action is to be
included. 5
Property in which any contingent interest is held is not subject to
equitable distribution. The underlying reason is that to grant such a
right would give the receiving spouse a right greater than that possessed by the owning spouse.
It is anticipated that the New York courts will follow a liberal
approach in their interpretation of interests in professional partnerships, business entities, and closely held corporations. The form of
entity will not determine whether equitable distribution is applicable.
Interests in corporations, partnerships, and joint ventures have all
been held subject to equitable distribution in New Jersey.6 6 Although
occasional questions arise in determining whether these interests are
subject to distribution, the more frequent and troublesome question is
67
that of valuation of a particular interest.

Riley, Status oJ Property as Separate, 20 Am. JuR. PnooF oF FAcrs 321 (1979).
See 65 N.J. at 214, 320 A.2d at 493; Scherzer v. Scherzer, 136 N.J. Super 397, 346 A.2d
434 (App. Div. 1975).
2W. NEISON, DIVORCE AN ANNULMNT § 16.46 (2d ed. 1968); Note, Equitable Distribution in New York, 45 At. L. REV. 483 (1980).
s New Jersey follows this approach. See generally Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484;
Scherzer v. Scherzer, 136 N.J. Super. 397, 346 A.2d 434 (App. Div. 1975).
" Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 345-46, 331 A.2d 257, 260-61 (1978); Lavene v. Lavene, 162
N.J. Super. 187, 192-99, 392 A.2d 621, 623-27 (Ch. Div. 1978), on remandfrom 148 N.J. Super.
267, 372 A.2d 629 (App. Div. 1977).
"' See Crosrnan, Identification and Valuationof Assets Subject to Equitable Distribution,56
N.D. L. REV. 201, 215 (1980).
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New York should be expected to follow New Jersey in accepting
established formulae in setting values of professional practices and

closely held corporations. The accepted accounting methods for business valuation include capitalization of earnings using a reasonable
rate of return on investment,6 8 placing a market value on the stock
through comparative analysis with companies in that given industry,69

and ascertaining the value of the stock which appears in a publicly
traded or an over-the-counter market.70 Since dividend income does
not reflect an accurate measurement, it is not used in establishing a
business value. 7' The goodwill of a business, 72 however, is an asset
generally subject to these considerations. 3
Other areas of concern facing the New York courts revolve
around whether personal injury claims, social security, stock options,
and pension plans are subject to equitable distribution. Once again,
the New York courts should wisely base the development of their case

law on New Jersey precedents.

74
The New Jersey judiciary held that a claim for personal injuries
was includable for purposes of equitable distribution. Additionally, a

later New Jersey case included a workman's compensation claim 75 as
an asset subject to equitable distribution. Nevertheless, social security
benefits have been held not to be includable as an asset subject to

equitable distribution by the New Jersey courts. 7

The exclusion of

social security benefits from distribution is explained by the overriding
federal policy considerations in favor of providing funds for assistance

" See Lavene v. Lavene, 162 N.J. Super. 187, 197, 392 A.2d 621, 626 (Ch. Div. 1978).
69 Id.

70 Id. at 198, 392 A.2d at 626.
71 Id.

72See Grosman, supra note 67, at 215; Comment, Valuation of ProfessionalGoodwill Upon
Marital Dissolution, 7 Sw. L. REv. 185 (1975).
73 Special attention should be given by practitioners to the use of expert testimony in
establishing the eight factors enumerated in Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, utilized in
ascertaining the value of a business's good will.
The eight factors are: the nature of the business and the history of the enterprise from its
inception; the economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the specific industry
in particular; the book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business; the earning
capacity of the company; the dividend-paying capacity; whether or not the enterprise has
goodwill or other intangible value; sales of the stock and the size of the block to be valued; and
the market price of stocks of corporations engaged in the same or similar line of business having
their stocks actively traded in a free and open market, either on exchange or over-the-counter.
Lavene v. Lavene, 162 N.J. Super. 187, 194, 392 A.2d 621, 624 (Ch. Div. 1978).
71 See Harmon v. Harmon, 161 N.J. Super. 206. 391 A.2d 553 (App. Div. 1978); DiTolvo v.
DiTolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72, 328 A.2d 625 (App. Div. 1974).
75 See Hughes v. Hughes, 132 N.J. Super. 559, 334 A.2d 378 (Ch. Div. 1978).
70 Biles v. Biles, 163 N.J. Super. 49, 394 A.2d 153 (Ch. Div. 1978).

1981]

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

in old age. 77 Stock option plans, however, held to be distributable by
New Jersey courts, 78 are subject to an analysis similar to that used in
pension plans.
C. Pension Plans
As a rule, courts will include employee benefits such as pension
plans and other rights of deferred compensation within the scope of
equitable distribution. New Jersey courts have consistently followed
this rule. 9 In Kruger v. Kruger,80 the court held that such benefits
are normally included among plans for family maintenance. 8' The
New York statute has adopted this view and specifically enumerates
the loss of pension rights as a factor in considering the future impact of
2
8
the dissolution of the marriage.

In New Jersey, the issue of whether a right is vested is decided by
examining whether the right has been acquired during the marriage,
and whether it is equitable to include it in the marital estate. 3
Usually, if the rights of the spouse are vested during the marriage they
will be included for equitable distribution, even though benefits
would not be recovered until a future date.8 4 It is reasoned that if a
pension is subject to a contingency, it is a mere expectation and the
proposed recipient has no fixed ascertainable interest in it. However,
if the pension is non-forfeitable, then the proposed recipient has a
fixed ascertainable interest in the pension, thus permitting it to be
subject to equitable distribution.85
The New York law appears to eliminate any distinction between
vested and contingent pension rights. It requires all pensions to be
considered, without the New Jersey distinctions as to when the rights
are acquired. 8 Whether New York courts will include this distinction in future decisions remains to be seen.
" Id. See Umber v. Umber, 591 S.W.2d 299 (Okla. 1979) (provided rationale for Biles v.
Biles, 163 N.J. Super. 49, 394 A.2d 153 (Ch. Div. 1978)).
70 Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J. Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561 (Ch. Div. 1976).
See Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 654 (1977); McGraw v. McGraw, 151 N.J.
Super. 515, 377 A.2d 697 (App. Div. 1977); Blitt v. Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213, 353 A.2d 144 (Ch.
Div. 1976); White v. White, 136 N.J. Super. 552, 347 A.2d 260 (App. Div. 1975); Pellegrino v.
Pellegrino, 134 N.J. Super. 512, 342 A.2d 226 (App. Div. 1975); Tucker v. Tucker, 121 N.J.
Super. 539, 298 A.2d 91 (Ch. Div. 1972).
73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977).
1 /d.

N.Y. DoM. REm.LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(4).
Weir v. Weir, 173 N.J. Super. 130, 138, 413 A.2d 638, 645 (Ch. Div. 1980).
e 73 N.J. at 471, 375 A.2d at 661-62.
I'
Id. at 469, 375 A.2d at 661.
See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(4). For a comparable New Jersey discussion, see
Blitt v. Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213, 353 A,2d 144 (Ch. Div. 1976).
82
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Another issue is whether a pension plan may be distributed or
compensated for at the time of equitable distribution. A recent United
States Supreme Court decision controls where there is a federally
funded pension. 7 In Hisquierdov. Hisquierdo,88 the Court reversed
the California Supreme Court, which had held that federally funded
railroad retirement benefits were subject to distribution as community
property of the marriage. 89 In the majority opinion authored by
Justice Blackmun, great weight was placed upon the sovereign immunity clause of the Railroad Retirement Act.90 Noting that the Act had
been amended, 9 ' Justice Blackmun viewed the change as creating a
definition of alimony which excluded any "payment or transfer of
property or its value by any individual to his spouse or former spouse
in compliance with any community property settlement, equitable
distribution of property, or other division of property between spouses
or former spouses." 92 Thus, the Court concluded that the legislature
intended the amendment to cut off the right of a divorced spouse to a
presently divisible interest in a pension plan. 93 The dissenting opin-

ion, authored by Justice Stewart, noted that such an analysis places
the spouse seeking distribution in a position comparable to that of a
common creditor seeking a garnishment of the pension. 94 The two
situations are readily distinguishable, according to Justice Stewart, in
that the spouse seeking distribution of the pension has ownership
rights and does not need to establish the right to a share as would a
common creditor. 95
In another case addressing the applicability of property distribution law to a federal pension plan, the court in Cose v. Cosege applied
this rationale to a military pension plan. 97 Relying on Hisquierdo,
the Cose court held a military pension not divisible between spouses at
98
the time of divorce.
Some commentators believe other federal legislation may cast
doubt upon the availability of private pension plans for immediate

s Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
439 U.S. 572 (1979).
'. Id. at 591.
Id. at 573-77.
" Id. at 576-77.
IId. at 577 (quoting Pub. L. No. 95-30, tit. V, § 501(d), 91 Stat. 160 (1977)).
IId. at 584.

Id. at 599 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
I9
Id.
11 592 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 1979), appeal pending, 104 S. Ct. 419 (1981).
97 Id.
98 Id.
5
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distribution at divorce.9 9 The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 '00 (ERISA) outlines vesting requirements of certain pri-

vate pension plans' 0 ' in trade related industries.' 0 2 One specific provision states that it "shall supersede

. . .

state laws."'° 3 Nonetheless,

New Jersey and New York legislators have jointly introduced federal
legislation designed to specifically exempt a state's alimony and property settlement laws from ERISA provisions.' 0 4 Since this legislation
is still pending, clarification as to current distributability of private
pensions is still an open issue. In the meantime, the Hisquierdo analysis should still be controlling.
V.

THE ROLE OF EDUCATIONAL DEGREES IN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

A continually troublesome question to the courts has been the

evaluation of an educational degree acquired through the financial
sacrifice of the other spouse. 105 One view, followed by Colorado10
and New Jersey courts, 0 7 holds that an educational degree resulting in
an enhanced earning power is not an asset to be considered during an

equitable distribution-regardless of whether the other spouse contributed financially to the degree's attainment. 0 8 This interpretation
is based on the premise that an educational degree is not property, but

rather is personal to its holder and not simply gained by expending

money. 10 9 The Colorado court characterized a degree as "an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition

of property.""

0

In New Jersey, the leading case has been Stern v.

Stern."' There the court held that "a person's earning capacity, even

11 Note, supra note 64, at 503-04. See Doyle, ERISA and the Non-Employee Spouse's
Community Interest in Retirement Pay, 4 CoMm. PRop. J. 3 (1977)- Foster & Freed, Spousal
Rights in Retirement and Pension Benefits, 16 J. FAN!. L. 187 (1977-78).
1- 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
101 Id. § 1053.
101Id. §§ 1001-1003.
103

Id. § 1144.

104 See Note, supra note 64, at 503 & n.104, for a discussion of this legislation.
103 The all too frequent scenario involves one spouse who supports the other during the latter's

education only to find that once the costly education is completed, the marriage is over. For a
discussion of the consequences of this situation, see Comment, Professional Education as a
Divisible Asset in Marriage Dissolutions, 65 IOWA L. REv. 705 (1979); Recent Development,
Divorce-The Effect of a Spouse's Professional Degree on a Division of Marital Property and
Award of Alimony, 15 TuLSA L. J. 378 (1979).
10 See In re Marriage of Crahm, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
107 Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1978).
108 See Note, supra note 64, at 495-96. "
109 Id.
1o In re Marriage of Grahm, 194 Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978).
! 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1978).
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where development has been aided and enhanced by the other spouse
. . .should not be recognized as a separable, particular item of prop-

erty." 1 2 Thus, this rationale can be summed up by stating that
potential earning capacity will not be considered an item subject to
equitable distribution.
Another view, followed particularly by the judiciary in Iowa" 3
and Missouri,114 holds that contributions by one spouse to the education of another can be the basis of an award to the contributing
spouse. The reasoning is that the husband and wife's present assets are
directly related to the educational degree earned since the spouse
earning the degree increased the earning capacity of the parties." 5
For example, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that money contributed by the wife toward her husband's legal education was of ascertainable value with regard to acquired marital property."16
Recently, a superior court decision in New Jersey"17 sided with
this school of thought by distinguishing the Stern case discussed
above."" In Lynn v. Lynn," 9 the court held that a medical degree
and license to practice medicine obtained by a spouse during the
marriage is to be included among assets subject to equitable distribution.'20 In reaching this result the court reviewed a litany of legal
precedents on this topic.' 2 ' The court distinguished between states
absolutely excluding educational degrees and/or licenses from equitable distribution or community property and those states which include
such degrees-but with severe limitations.'12 The court noted that
valuation of an educational degree as an asset would be a most difficult process. Nonetheless, it held that such difficulties should not
preclude some solution to the problem. 23 Judge Krafte, who authored the opinion, stated the following:
The syndrome is, unfortunately, becoming more a product of
our times and must be dealt with by incursions into traditional
thinking and the abandonment of all parochial notions of restric2 d. at 345, 331 A.2d at 260.
113In
1I In

re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
115 See Note, supra note 64, at 496-97.
116 In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
1"7 Lynn v. Lynn, [1981] FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 3001 (N.J. Ch. Div.
1981).
1,8See notes 111-12 supra and accompanying text.
119 [1981] FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 3001 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1981).
120Id. at 3007.
"I Id. at 3002-07.
It=Id. at 3005.
123Id. at 3006-07.
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tive boundaries. To do otherwise would render courts of equity
impotent and unable to do more 24than recognize what all courts
agree to be an 'obvious injustice."1
Since New Jersey has now arguably joined those jurisdictions
which include a spouse's contribution to an educational degree of the
other spouse, it is likely that New York will follow suit. The New York
statute is in fact framed to allow, if needed, the inclusion of an
educational degree as a consideration in the determination of equitable distribution. The New York statute explicitly states that "any
equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made
of the other spouse," shall be
...
to the career or career potential
25
distribution.1
equitable
included in
If the New York courts follow the lead of New Jersey in its recent
decision on educational degrees, 126 they are likely to encounter the
same difficulties in assessing the value of the degree. Although the
results will vary in assessing the value of the degree due to the particular facts of a case, the courts will still have to focus upon the duration
of the marriage, the age of the parties, the amount of distributable
assets, and the future earning capacity of the parties to reach an
equitable result.

VII.

AGREEMENTS

The recent New York statute broadened the permissible scope of
contractual agreement between parties.' 2 7 As presently written, the
statute permits parties to enter agreements on or after its effective
date, July 19, 1980. In essence, the parties may contract out of equitable distribution and, within certain limits, write their own agreement. 2 8 By contrast to previous New York law, the parties may now
specify the duration and amount of maintenance.' 29 Requirements
for this freedom to contract are that an agreement must be written,
subscribed to by the parties, and acknowledged or proven in the
manner prescribed to record a deed. In addition, the provisions of any
agreement must be fair and reasonable when made, and conscionable
at the time of judgment.' 30
"I

Id. at 3007.

N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(6). The framers of the statute had the foresight to
anticipate the situation in which a supporting spouse has delayed or sacrificed an education until
"'

the other spouse's education is completed.
"' See notes 117-24 supra and accompanying text.
," N.Y. DoM. RnL. LAw § 236(B)(3).

128Id.
'to Id.
130 Id.
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VIII. DISTRIBUTION AwARs
It must be noted that the New York statute goes a step further
than the New Jersey law by including a provision for a distributive
award. 1 31 These are monetary awards granted to a spouse in place of
an actual distribution of property. Under the statute, a monetary
award may be granted when a court "determine[s] that equitable
distribution is appropriate, but would be impractical or burdensome
or where the distribution of an interest in a business, corporation or
profession would be contrary to law."'132 The court, in its discretion,
also may make a distributive award to supplement, facilitate, or
effectuate a distribution of marital property. 33 The distributive
award may be made payable to either party in a lump sum, or over a
period of time in fixed amounts. They are not to include payments
which are treated as ordinary income to the recipient under the
34
United States Internal Revenue Code.1
IX.

THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DISCIRETION

Although statutory definitions are an aid to the courts in determining assets available for distribution, the crucial factor in any
award of equitable distribution will be that of judicial discretion.
The New York statute contains a provision which lists criteria on
which the judge must implement any decision. 35 It also includes a
provision which requires the court to file a written report outlining
the precise factors used in its decision. 36 The purpose of these provisions is to minimize potential abuses of judicial discretion.' 3 7
In creating these factors, the framers of the New York statute
were guided by what they perceived to be flaws in New Jersey's
system of property distribution. According to one commentator, it
was unbalanced awards resulting in litigation and controverted property settlements which were creating the backlog in the New Jersey
court calendar. 38 Other criticism is that the unbridled discretion

'"' Id. § 236(B)(5)(e).
132 Id.
133

Id.

134Id.

13sSee notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
N.Y. DoM. RaL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(g) provides: "In any decision made pursuant to this
subdivision, the court shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision and
such may not be waived by either party or counsel."
137 For a discussion of judicial discretion in property settlements, see Muookin & Kornhauser,
Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979).
'3 Sassower, Looking Anew For FairDivorce Law, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1980, § 11, at 18,
138

col. 1.
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afforded judges in the determination of equitable distribution is a
primary cause of the court's backlog.139 Whether these criticisms of
the New Jersey system are justified is open to debate.140 Nonetheless,
there are still similar problems in these New York provisions overlooked by the drafters of the statute. For example, the requirement of
a written report for each case of equitable distribution reduces the
time a judge will spend on the bench, since time will have to be spent
writing reports. The statute is also vague in its discussion of the proper
factors required in the judicial report. As a result, judges may tend to
stress whatever factors of the statute's guidelines they please, thus
allowing for divergent decisionmaking.41
X.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW

Yom(

The first months following the implementation of the New York
statute have resulted in a climate of confusion. There has been little
progress thus far by the New York courts toward any definitive and
consistent trend in interpreting the statute. For instance, the rulings
have varied from a holding that the statute is retroactive, 42 to a
holding that it is not retroactive.1 43 Furthermore, one court has
disallowed discovery of clients in a spouse's law firm , 44 while another
has ruled that a comprehensive financial disclosure of a spouse's assets
is required.145 Other New York courts' interpretation of the statute
have been clearer. A Nassau County supreme court held that a court
may provide for equitable distribution of property of a defaulting
party without any further hearing.146 The court stated that to do
otherwise "simply because one side defaults would give to the party
choosing not to appear an advantage in defaulting and constitute a
47
prejudice to the party seeking equitable distribution."1

'IQ One recent comment described the statute as the source of the problem in New Jersey, and
suggested that New Jersey follow the New York example by adopting guidelines written into the
statute in order to limit judicial discretion. See Note, supra note 64, at 504-05.
110The Supreme Court of New Jersey's Pashman Commission recently released its report on
problems confronting the matrimonial court as well as possible solutions. See SuPREmE Count
COMMrIrEEON MATRIMONIAL LITIGATION, PHASE-Two, FINAL REPor (June 10, 1981) (reprinted
as a supplement to 108 N.J.L.J. 41 (July 16, 1981).
141 Contra, Note, supra note 64, at 506.
" Deschamps v. Deschamps, [1980) FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
113 Cooper v. Cooper, [1980] FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2770 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
14 Stolowitz v. Stolowitz, [1981] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2148 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
Is Ruossos v. Ruossos, [1981] FM. L. REP. (BNA) 2157 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 1981).
148 Ettinger v. Ettinger, [1981] FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2277 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 11, 1981).
14 Id. at 2278.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:37

Another New York supreme court in Erie County held that a
1979 separation agreement amounted to a complete property settlement agreement and thereby obviated the need for equitable distribution under the 1980 statute, 48 even though the action was filed after
the new law became effective. 49 In arguing that only a partial
distribution took place, the wife depended upon a 1977 New Jersey
supreme court case, Smith v. Smith, 50 which mandated equitable
distribution under the New Jersey law despite an agreement dating
back to 1965. The New York court distinguished Smith, stating that
the Smith agreement was one for mere support, whereas the case
before the court was clear in providing that the parties intended a
5
complete property division by use of expressions of finality. ' '
As a result of these rulings, attorneys practicing in New York are
now proceeding with extreme caution in view of the more complex
and time consuming issues they are confronted with in the new
law. 5 2 Counsel fees are also on the increase for matrimonial
actions. 53 According to one recent article, attorney's fees may as
much as double due to the increased expense and effort expended by
attorneys adapting to the statute and the subsequent interpretive decisions.

54

CONCLUSION

The New York equitable distribution law's most significant
change is that it allows the judiciary more flexibility and discretion.
Although not allowing as much discretion as New Jersey law, the new
law now frees the judiciary from the restraints of the fixed and narrow
guidelines which existed prior to its enactment. In place of the former
rigidity, the new law provides a more general criterion and methodology for the examination of the particular facts of each case.
The New York courts will seek guidance from other jurisdictions
with more experience in implementing the principles of equitable

148

Gedratis v. Gedratis, [1981] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1066 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 1981).

149 Id.

110Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 371 A.2d 1 (1977).
" Gedratis v. Gedratis, [1981] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1066 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 1981).
112 CastiUo, Divorce Costs Rise Under New Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1981, at 1,col. 1.
153

Id.

154 Id.

See also Hinds, Divorce Law and Women, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1981, at 21, col. 1.
Hinds stated that a New York divorce will cost each spouse the following, depending upon the
nature of the case: a simple settlement-$1,500; an "average complex case"-$10,000 to
$15,000; a case involving a custody fight-$15,000 to $20,000. Id.
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distribution. This will necessarily include New Jersey, which has been
in the forefront of developments in equitable distribution.15 For both judge and attorney, the New York equitable distribution law opens a new phase of the law, with a perspective quite
dissimilar to that of the past. It offers the challenge of imagination
and creativity. At the same time, caution will be the watchword-especially in the early years as New York courts attempt to integrate
tested principles, like those set by its neighbor, 5 into its own juris57
prudence. 1

"'

For additional information on Equitable Distribution in New Jersey, see C.
220 (3d ed. 1976).

SKOLOFF, NEW

JERsEY FAMILY LAW PancrIcE

I" See note 155 supra.

,31 For an excellent introduction to New York's recently enacted law, see Foster, Equitable
Distribution, 184 N.Y.L.J., 17 (July 24, 1980). For a comprehensive discussion of the New York
law, see NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE-MATRIMONIAL ACTIONS AND FAMILY COURT PROCEEDINGS
(1980) (Special Supp. Sept. 1980) (covering equitable distribution and miscellaneous provisions
under N.Y. Laws 1980, ch. 281, effective July 19, 1980).

